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Introduction 
Recent revelations about failings in the regulation of medical devices have focused on 
implantable devices.1 But diagnostic devices also have problems, as was made clear in 2016 
when the US government took action against Theranos, a high profile diagnostics 
manufacturer based in Silicon Valley. The pathology laboratory run by Theranos was shut 
down after government investigations revealed problems with the firm’s proprietary 
diagnostic technologies. Theranos admitted that “tens of thousands” of test results had to 
be voided or revised for everything from cholesterol levels to pregnancy, with unknown 
implications for patients. The firm was subsequently charged with defrauding investors, 
doctors, and patients.2 
These revelations provoked a sudden reversal of fortune for Theranos, which was valued at 
$9bn (£7bn; €8bn) in 2015 and promoted itself as a poster child for transforming healthcare 
through diagnostic innovation. Theranos claimed to have developed technology to run 
multiple clinical tests simultaneously, much more cheaply and quickly than conventional 
laboratory tests and using only a tiny sample of blood. Theranos’s chief executive, Elizabeth 
Holmes, promoted the idea that this technology would revolutionise pathology and usher in 
a new era of preventive medicine. Cheap, painless, and convenient testing services would 
encourage people to monitor their health more often3—a business strategy purpose built to 
foster overdiagnosis and overtreatment.4 
Yet the firm’s spectacular downfall, the failure of its technology, and the defrauding of its 
investors was not solely a result of corporate hubris. Theranos should be recognised as a 
regulatory scandal that shows the potential for harm from unregulated diagnostics (box 1). 
How was this allowed to happen? 
Theranos launched in the US market with no review by the US Food and Drug 
Administration to assess the safety, efficacy, or manufacturing quality of its products. The 
company profited from a gaping regulatory loophole that creates a bifurcated diagnostics 
market in the US and elsewhere: test kits sold by manufacturers for use in external 
laboratories are regulated by the FDA, but tests developed and performed in the 
developer’s clinical laboratories (so called “laboratory developed tests” or LDTs) are rarely 
subject to FDA authority (box 2). 
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Box 1  
Harms of poor diagnostics 
Patient harms 
 False positive results may unnecessarily create psychological anxiety and prompt further diagnostic 
tests, which may themselves be risky  
 Overdiagnosis has some of the same effects but also risks overtreatment, even though the diagnosis 
and any interventions may be experienced as good care 
 False negative results may give patients false reassurance and delay or avert necessary treatment7 
Problems for doctors 
 Poorly evaluated tests hamper doctors’ efforts to help patients, waste their time in unnecessary 
procedures, and open them to the danger of accusations of malpractice and the threat of litigation 
Costs to the healthcare system 
 Inappropriate tests can waste resources that could have been used to deliver genuine clinical benefits  
 False positive results or overdiagnosis may trigger unnecessary and costly additional tests or 
treatments7 
 
 
Box 2  
Laboratory developed tests explained  
Diagnostic tests can be either in vivo (eg, using imaging technology) or in vitro (on samples taken from 
patients). This article focuses on in vitro tests. Companies making in vitro diagnostics have two routes to 
market—kits or laboratory developed tests (LDTs).  
 Test kits are manufactured and sold for use in laboratories, in healthcare facilities (point of care), or at 
home (over the counter) and are subject to medical device regulations, including premarket review of 
safety and efficacy of novel tests.  
 LDTs are used in the developer’s clinical laboratory and marketed as a commercial service. Companies 
that decide to market their test as an LDT typically send out sample collection kits, analyse the 
returned samples, and provide customers with an interpretation of the results.  
 
Theranos is not alone in exploiting this loophole. Many firms in the molecular diagnostics 
sector choose to commercialise their tests as LDTs rather than as test kits, a cause for 
concern given that this sector is the fastest growing part of the in vitro diagnostics 
industry.8 The sector was worth $7.3bn in global revenues in 2016.9 Calls for stricter 
oversight of this nascent industry have been made in a succession of high level policy 
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reports that have exposed multiple failings in the regulatory frameworks for diagnostics in 
Europe and North America.101112 
Response to these calls for change has been mixed. Canada has made no proposal for 
regulatory change, and longstanding efforts at comprehensive reform in the US have 
faltered. In the EU, by contrast, a weak regulatory regime is in the process of major reform. 
We review policy developments related to two key loopholes in diagnostics regulatory 
regimes in these three jurisdictions and assess their implications for the protection of public 
health. 
Loophole for laboratory developed tests 
There is nothing new about LDTs; historically, much diagnostic innovation has happened 
within hospital laboratories. What is unprecedented is the burgeoning commercial 
exploitation of the LDT route to market. Firms that sell LDTs are subject to laboratory 
regulation in many jurisdictions,1314 but they can bypass statutory medical device 
regulation and thus premarket review of their products. As a consequence, there may not 
even be a public record of which LDTs are on the market. 
In the EU this loophole is likely to close once new regulations for in vitro diagnostics come 
into full effect in 2022.15 Under the in vitro diagnostic directive kits were subject to risk 
based regulation, but many LDTs were exempt because they were manufactured by “health 
institutions.” This exemption may have been intended to allow hospital labs to bypass 
statutory review, but it has been interpreted much more generously, creating an easy route 
to market for LDT firms. A more consistent and comprehensive approach is expected under 
the new regulation: providing that certain safeguards are in place, health institutions will 
continue to be exempt, but LDTs that are manufactured on an “industrial scale” will not be. 
This critical caveat, which has yet to be clearly defined, should ensure that most LDTs 
produced by commercial companies will be subject to the same requirements as test kits. 
By contrast with the EU’s recent and decisive policy reform, the FDA has tried and largely 
failed to close the LDT loophole for more than 25 years. The agency asserted its legal 
authority over LDTs in the early 1990s and has taken action against some of the most 
egregious actions of individual firms, perhaps most famously when it shut down the health 
related services of leading consumer genetics firm 23andMe for marketing unvalidated 
tests.16 Like many of its rivals, 23andMe’s core offer to consumers was polygenic risk 
profiles. Such tests have been widely criticised for providing misleading results based on a 
premature application of evolving understandings of the genetic basis of disease, and as a 
gateway to broadening disease categories, overdiagnosis, and the medicalisation of the 
worried well. 
Whatever the success of the FDA’s more piecemeal efforts to tackle aspects of the LDT 
problem, the agency’s attempts at comprehensive policy reform have been curtailed, 
battered by shifting political winds and the resistance of clinical laboratories (which, in the 
US, are typically commercial or are major revenue streams for the health systems with 
which they are affiliated).13 Draft guidance issued by the FDA in 2014 proposed a significant 
expansion of oversight,17 which was resisted by much of the laboratory sector. In 2016, 
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concurrent with the Theranos scandal, the FDA signalled that the guidance would be 
finalised.18 However, shortly after President Trump was elected, the agency dropped the 
plan, issuing instead an LDT discussion paper in 2017.19 
Meanwhile, a coalition of leading US reference laboratories and some large diagnostics 
manufacturers has proposed a new approach. Their draft legislation would mean that LDTs 
have some level of premarket scrutiny and could level the playing field for regulation of 
LDTs and test kits. However, it could reduce the quality of premarket scrutiny overall by 
undermining the FDA’s authority to collect and review data.20 In response to concerns, the 
bill was redrafted to clarify the FDA’s premarket review powers, but only for the highest risk 
diagnostic tests,21 and the bill remains a threat to the scope of the FDA’s authority. 
Although both the EU and US have made efforts to close the LDT loophole, Canadian 
regulators remain passive. A 2007 report commissioned by Health Canada identified 
possible responses to the LDT loophole,22 but thus far Health Canada has done nothing. 
The LDT loophole means that many tests are commercialised without undergoing premarket 
review for safety and efficacy, even when the intended use could have serious effects on 
patient welfare. The rapidly growing market for “non-invasive prenatal testing” (NIPT) 
exemplifies the problem. This new approach to prenatal screening can determine the risk of 
certain fetal conditions using maternal blood samples and is projected to have a market 
value of $3.13bn by 2023.23 There are at least 86 tests on the market globally that were not 
subject to independent premarket review for safety and efficacy in the US or Canada, 
though several firms have declared their compliance with EU regulations (table 1). 
Table 1  
Regulatory approval of non-invasive prenatal tests and breast cancer prognostics in EU, 
US, and Canada 
  
                            No approved for use 
                                       Available    EU* FDA  Health Canada 
Non-invasive prenatal tests    86    8  0      0 
Breast cancer prognosis    11    8  2      2 
* Self certified with CE mark that products are compliant with EU regulations. 
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Such discretionary use of regulatory review is even more apparent in breast cancer 
prognostics, which guide postadjuvant treatment decisions. Several proprietary tests have 
been developed, but although they are broadly similar, the regulatory approach differs. 
Some tests are sold as regulated kits whereas others are sold as unregulated LDTs, including 
the market leader, Oncotype DX, which has a list price of $4620 and generated $340.8m in 
revenue for Genomic Health in 2017.24 
Yet as the draft US legislation on LDTs indicates, levelling the playing field between kits and 
LDTs may do more harm than good if it means that all tests are subject to a lower regulatory 
bar for safety and efficacy. The danger of such an approach is shown by a second loophole—
risk classification—which new EU regulation will shrink, even as draft US legislation 
threatens its expansion. 
Risk classification loophole 
Diagnostic device regulations are risk based; tests classed as higher risk are subject to 
greater regulatory scrutiny and stricter evidentiary standards. Higher risk devices are 
typically subject to premarket review, but classification schemes vary across jurisdictions, 
and this creates a second regulatory loophole for molecular diagnostics, particularly in 
Europe. 
The EU’s current risk classification system is uniquely inadequate. Under this system nearly 
all tests are classed as low risk, allowing manufacturers to self declare regulatory 
compliance and give the product a CE mark, which indicates conformity with EU regulations. 
The OvaCheck test for ovarian cancer shows the problem. Even though the FDA issued a 
warning letter about this test in 2004, and then determined that the test did not accurately 
predict or detect ovarian cancer,25 OvaCheck was CE marked for sale in Europe by the 
manufacturer in 2010.2627 
Once fully implemented, the EU’s new regulation will close this regulatory loophole.15 The 
new regulation places most molecular diagnostics in a higher risk category, meaning they 
have to go through premarket review by a notified body (the regulatory authority that 
assesses compliance with regulations). As a result, a far broader range of diagnostic tests 
will be subject to independent scrutiny before they can enter the EU market. 
The US, however, is moving in the opposite direction, proposing to downgrade diagnostics 
that were once deemed high risk and draft legislation threatening to excuse lower risk tests 
from any premarket review. Thus tests for conditions such as HIV and hepatitis C virus 
would be deemed lower risk and require less rigorous scrutiny before marketing.  
What has been the effect of the EU’s regulatory loophole? A clear example of the public 
health implications is provided by cervical cancer screening. Molecular tests for human 
papillomavirus (HPV) emerged in the 1990s as a new approach to cervical cancer screening, 
aiming to supplement or replace the traditional smear test, which has repeatedly been 
mired in scandals of both overdetection and underdetection. HPV tests are rated as higher 
risk tests in the US and Canada and must have premarket review, but in the EU the tests are 
classified as low risk and manufacturers self certify regulatory compliance. Only seven HPV 
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tests have been approved by the FDA and five by Health Canada, but 87 tests are authorised 
for sale in the EU. The high number of HPV tests in the EU is concerning given that in 2012 
most of the 125 HPV tests available worldwide did not have validation studies published in 
peer reviewed journals.28 Given that HPV is far more prevalent than cervical cancer, poorly 
validated tests risk substantial overdiagnosis. The new EU regulation should allow greater 
assurance that the CE mark can be trusted as a credential of safety and efficacy. 
Conclusion 
It remains to be seen whether genomics will transform medical practice, but the molecular 
diagnostics sector continues to grow rapidly. The EU’s strengthened regulation for in vitro 
diagnostics shows that policy makers can respond to these new challenges, although 
vigilance will be needed to ensure that the new system achieves its public health potential. 
By contrast, Canada’s inaction is notable. Meanwhile, the FDA’s failure to progress its 
proposals for enhanced oversight of LDTs means that the world’s largest diagnostics market 
remains dangerously bifurcated—a medical device industry that can choose whether its 
products are FDA regulated is bad for patients, clinicians, and healthcare systems. 
Stakeholders should also be concerned about the current industry sponsored draft 
legislation circulating in the US Congress. 
As the example of Theranos indicates, we must be sceptical of bold claims for the 
transformative potential of new diagnostic technologies. Regulatory agencies have a critical 
role in scrutinising the scientific data behind the corporate hype. Stakeholders must 
continue to press for robust evidence and rigorous evaluation as safeguards against 
premature commercialisation. 
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